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Harnessing the commons to govern water as a flow 
Julie TROTTIER, CNRS, UMR Art-Dev. 
Résumé 
Cet article explore l’utilité de reconnaître les communs qui gouvernent l’eau destinée à l’irrigation.  
Il mobilise la notion de communs pour comprendre les interactions de pouvoir en jeu au sein des 
transformations se réalisant sur des échelles locale, nationale et internationale. Il propose de se 
saisir des externalités positives générées par les communs afin de transformer les interactions 
politiques et économiques aux échelles nationale et internationale. Bien qu’il s’appuie sur une 
étude de cas palestinienne, ce développement conceptuel peut être appliqué n’importe où. 
Les Palestiniens gèrent depuis longtemps l’irrigation en tant que communs au niveau local. 
Cependant, l’attention massive qu’a suscitée leur combat national a mené les chercheurs à se 
focaliser sur les institutions nationales plutôt que sur les institutions locales. Cette focalisation sur 
l’échelle nationale a aussi favorisé la perception de l’eau en tant que stock plutôt qu’en tant que 
flux. Tous les aquifères de Cisjordanie sont partagés avec Israël. Les accords d’Oslo les ont traités 
comme un stock et les ont divisés quantitativement entre deux utilisateurs : Israël et l’Autorité 
Palestinienne. Reconnaître l’existence de communs au sein de l’irrigation palestinienne nous 
permet de traiter l’eau comme un flux. En effet, la même goutte d’eau coule successivement au 
travers de plusieurs institutions. Certaines sont palestiniennes et d’autres sont israéliennes. 
Chacune déploie des régimes de propriété définis sur des niveaux d’échelle différents.  
Cet article examine l’utilité de considérer l’eau comme un flux qui est géré successivement par 
cette variété d’institutions. Au niveau local, ceci nous permet de comprendre les interactions 
entre les petits agriculteurs et les agribusiness voisines, par exemple. Ceci nous permet de 
comprendre les bouleversements au sein des interactions de pouvoir qui ont lieu lorsqu’une 
économie marchande entre en interaction avec une économie humaine. Au niveau national, ceci 
nous permet de nous pencher sur la gouvernance des paracommuns. Ce terme désigne les gains 
matériels qui sont potentiellement générés par l’amélioration de l’efficience au sein de différents 
systèmes s’approvisionnant tous auprès de la même source d’eau. De tels gains sont forcément 
dynamiques car l’amélioration de l’efficience au sein d’un système implique souvent une perte 
pour un système voisin ou pour un système éloigné mais lié au premier. L’ensemble de ces gains 
matériels potentiels constituent un nouveau commun dont l’appropriation doit être gouvernée. Il 
s’agit d’un paracommun car il n’existe que si les projets d’amélioration de l’efficience de différents 
systèmes sont réalisés. Les bailleurs financent massivement de nombreux projets visant à 
améliorer l’efficience de l’irrigation. Il est maintenant urgent de faire face à la question de la 
gouvernance des paracommuns de l’irrigation palestinienne. Cet article analyse la façon dont le 
capital social élaboré au sein des communs existants peut contribuer à cela. Enfin, au niveau 
international, inclure les institutions émergeant des communs au sein d’une structure 
institutionnelle qui gère l’eau en tant que flux nous permet de sortir de l’impasse actuelle des 
négociations concernant l’eau entre Israël et l’Autorité Palestinienne. Cet article détaille la façon 
dont ceci peut être réalisé. 
Mots-clés : irrigation, communs, conflit israélo-palestinien, paracommuns, gouvernance de l’eau 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the usefulness of recognizing the commons governing irrigation water. It 
harnesses the commons to understand the power interactions at play in transformations over 
local, national and international scales. It proposes to harness the positive externalities commons 
generate in order to transform political and economic interactions at the national and 
international scales. Although it uses a Palestinian case study, this conceptual development can 
apply anywhere. 
Palestinians have long managed irrigation as commons at the local level. But the overwhelming 
attention paid to their national struggle has led most researchers to focus on national institutions 
instead. It has also favored treating water as a stock rather than a flow. All West Bank aquifers are 
shared with Israel. The Oslo agreements treated them as a stock and divided them quantitatively 
between two users: Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Recognising the existence of commons 
in Palestinian irrigation allows treating water as a flow. Indeed, the same water drops flow 
successively through several institutions, some Palestinian and others Israeli, deploying different 
property regimes over varying scalar levels. 
This paper examines the usefulness of considering water as a flow that is managed successively by 
such a variety of institutions. At the local level, it allows us to understand the interactions 
between smallholders and neighboring agribusinesses, for example. It allows us to understand the 
upheaval in power interactions when a merchant economy attempts to supplant a human 
economy. At the national level, it allows us to address the governance of the paracommons. This 
term designates the material gains potentially generated by the improvement of efficiency within 
various systems all drawing on the same source of water. Such gains are dynamic because the 
efficiency gain in one system often entails a loss in a neighbouring system or in a distant, yet 
interlinked, system. These material gains thus constitute a new commons, the appropriation of 
which needs to be governed. It is a paracommons because it doesn’t exist until the projects 
designed to improve the efficiency of different systems are implemented. Donors are funding 
heavily projects purporting to improve irrigation efficiency. Addressing the governance of the 
paracommons of Palestinian irrigation is now urgent. This paper analyses the manner the social 
capital developed in existing commons can contribute to this. Finally, at the international level, 
including the institutions emerging from the commons into an institutional structure that 
manages water as a flow allows us to break the deadlock of present water negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The paper details the manner this can be achieved. 
Key words: irrigation, commons, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, paracommons, water governance 
JEL Classification: D71, H82, 012, 013, 017, 019, 035, 038, Q15, Q24, Q25, Q28.  
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I. Introduction 
Social science research on water has tended to perceive water as a stock. When fuelled by field 
work, research on the commons has tended to focus either on small scale systems of natural 
resource management or on large scale management of immaterial resources. When fuelled by 
theoretical reflections, research on the common (or on commoning) often promotes it as the 
political principle that will coalesce anticapitalist movements. This paper examines the usefulness of 
recognizing the existing commons already governing water as a flow instead of a stock. It promotes 
their study within the context of their interactions with institutions active over other scalar levels. 
Commons do not function in autarchy. Their members, although keen to defend their common, 
systematically engage with the state and with capitalism. This article uses the example of Palestinian 
water to argue that we would benefit from harnessing the existing commons managing water as a 
flow into a wider institutional structure. This does not mean designing them into categories dictated 
by the state or by private businesses. A common can only be constructed endogenously, by those 
who construct co-obligations within it. Accepting the diversity of categories they produce means 
accepting the interactions among different value systems. It means accepting the messiness of the 
world, something pure theoretical developments prevents but field work forces us to recognize. 
 
II.  Water: a stock or a flow? 
Water can be conceptualised both as a stock and as a flow. When thought of as a stock, water 
becomes a resource that can be appropriated. Water in a plastic bottle or in a water tanker becomes 
a commodity. When thought of as a flow, water becomes a resource that cannot be appropriated. 
Approaching water as a flow forces us to consider all of our interactions with it, while removing it 
from the realm of commodities. 
Much of the literature concerning water confuses water use and water consumption. Water use 
designates the volume of water that goes through the hands of water users. Water consumption 
designates the volume of water that leaves the system through a given use. For example, a profligate 
user of domestic water may use one cubic meter when he takes a shower while consuming hardly 
any water at all. Water can only be consumed in either of three ways: reaching the sea, evaporating 
from the ground or other surfaces, or evapo-transpiring through the leaves of plants or through an 
animal. The rest of the water that we use keeps flowing in the system. Very little of the water used 
in a shower actually evaporates. Most of it pursues its trajectory, first through the drain of the 
shower, then through a cesspit or wastewater system into the environment. In irrigation however, 
large amounts of water either evaporate or evapo-transpirate. At the global scale, irrigation accounts 
for 93% of the water that is consumed by humans. 
Considering water only as a stock, and neglecting the fact it is a flow through the environment, has 
led many authors to consider water use in a manner that amounts to fraudulent accounting. The 
Oslo agreements provide a typical example. Treating the three shared aquifers between Israel and 
the West Bank as an immobile stock, they apportioned quantities of water to each of Israel and the 
 
Palestinian Authority. The figures that appear in the 1995 agreement correspond to the overall 
volume of water used the year before. They do not correspond to the water that was consumed the 
year before. In other words, the same water drop was counted many times over within each of the 
portions attributed to both parties.  
 
Table 1: Water sharing in the Olso Agreements - 1995 
 Million Cubic Meters for 
Israel 
Million Cubic Meters for 
Palestinian Authority 
Western Aquifer 340 22 
Eastern Aquifer 40 54 
+78 to be developed 
Northeastern Aquifer 103 42 
 
Source : (Trottier, 1999) 
 
Presently locked in a squabble over quantities, as if water was only an immobile stock, Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations on water are at a standstill.  This is problematic both because examples 
abound showing us that considering water as a flow could lead to easy progress in those 
negotiations and because focusing on volume misses the main point. As water flows, its quality is 
altered. Examining the biography of a water drop illustrates this easily. A raindrop falling in the 
West Bank, the area that covers most of the recharge of the three aquifers, penetrates the soil and 
emerges in a spring or a shallow well managed by farmers in the West Bank. It goes through a 
locally crafted institution, a common, that directs it to a field. If it is not evapo-transpired through 
the leaves of a plant, it seeps into the soil and keeps travelling into the aquifer. However, it is now 
laden with chemicals: herbicides, pesticides or fertilizers. The same water drop may then show up in 
a Palestinian Authority well. It now goes through a public institution that chlorinates it, does not 
remove the chemicals because water utilities never do, and distributes it only for domestic purposes. 
Our water drop then travels to a toilet and returns to the environment now carrying bacteriological 
contaminants. It keeps travelling until it shows up in an Israeli well. It is now handled by a state 
governed, public institution that chlorinates it once again and distributes it. As the Israeli system is 
integrated nationally, our water drop may be pumped up to a settlement such as Ariel for example. 
Back on the ridge that runs north-south in the West Bank, our water drop will keep on travelling, 
going through institutions that apply very different rules while engaging with the same flow. 
Addressing water as a flow has a series of implications. For example, Palestinians in Anabta refugee 
camp could benefit from installing a wastewater sewer system. Presently, waste water floods occur 
regularly. But if such a wastewater system is set up, the Israeli Ministry of Housing will agree to 
building permits for the settlement of Pizgat Zeev, lower down the hill from Anabta refugee camp. 
The untreated sewage that flows into the settlement area scheduled to be constructed presently 
deters the Ministry of Housing from agreeing to the permits. Further south, the village of Wadi 
Fukin has seen the flow of its springs decrease dramatically because of the construction of the 
 
settlement of Betar Illit and of the Israeli town of Tzur Hadassah. The entire recharge area of these 
springs lies within this narrow valley of 6 km². (Haviv and Asaf 2005) The impermeable land cover 
created by the constructions above the village interfere with the recharge of the springs. Water is 
not lost. It is directed somewhere else. As Wadi Fukin is an agricultural village relying on irrigation, 
the impact is severe. These examples illustrate how inadequate a representation of water in terms of 
volume can be. Once we think of water as a flow, we are forced to take into account all of our 
interactions with it. Activities that seem to lie outside of the realm of water, such as construction, 
suddenly appear clearly connected with it. Conceptualising water as a flow forces us to understand 
that we have a multiplicity of interactions with that resource. It can never be appropriated although 
water users, such as the farmers of Wadi Fukin, can be dispossessed when the flow is reoriented so 
that it bypasses them. Once we think of water as a flow, our fundamental challenge becomes one of 
managing collectively our interactions with that flow. It can no longer be conceived as an issue of 
how many cubic volumes for each party. 
 
III. Treating water as a common  
The ebullient literature on the common(s) provides a variety of definitions for that term. The 
commons property movement, initially kicked off with the Maryland conference in 1985, focused 
on the management of renewable resources such as fisheries, forests, and water in irrigation 
networks. It defined common property resources as as non-excludable, i.e. it is very difficult to 
exclude users from accessing and using the resource, and rivalrous, i.e. what is consumed by one user 
cannot be consumed by another. (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Dietz et al. 2002) The organisation 
around the exploitation of such a resource is what made it a common. Ostrom identified a series of 
rules that kept reappearing in institutions managing such resources sustainably both economically 
and environmentally. Later, the concept of commons was extended to include immaterial resources 
such as knowledge, for example. This led many authors to assume an analytic distinction between 
the immaterial commons and the material commons. (Hardt and Negri 2009) In the case of material 
commons, nature is perceived as providing a stock of resources which limits human action. In the 
case of immaterial commons, nature is no longer perceived as limiting. Open access software, such 
as QGIS for example, illustrates an immaterial commons. All users are given access to the code and 
are invited to improve it. As the number of users increases, so does the usefulness and productivity 
of the software. 
Many have challenged identifying a common on the basis of the characteristics of the resources 
managed by that institution. (Bresnihan 2015) Several authors point to the etymological root of the 
word commons. Munus means a co-obligation. The common can be conceived as a political 
principle whereby a group of individuals define obligations to each other while taking part in a 
common activity or a common task to deal with something that cannot be appropriated. (Dardot 
and Laval 2015) This is useful when examining water. It is a material resource. But, the techno-
science that surrounds it, whether it is a scientific discourse such as the hydrologists’ analysis of the 
recharge of Wadi Fukin springs, or a technology such as hydroponics, is an immaterial resource. So, 
when looking at a commons managing water, we cannot afford to consider only the rules developed 
 
to deal with the material resource locally. We need to examine simultaneously the scientific 
discourse and the technological choices that are involved. Knowledge concerning the environment 
is systematically altered when it circulates and when it is applied. (Goldman, Nadasdy et al. 2011) 
This is a well-known fact within social studies of science (STS), yet it doesn’t appear to have been 
integrated much in the effervescent literature concerning the commons. 
Much of the recent research on the commons has turned away from natural resources to focus on 
immaterial resources such as open access software (Coriat 2015). As opposed to the initial work in 
this field, recent research is focused on the theoretical development far more than on fieldwork. 
One side-effect of this is that clean theoretical categories are not confronted to the messiness of 
empirical results emerging from field observations. Individuals setting up a system of co-obligations 
within a common are embedded in a variety of social and economic interactions over many scalar 
levels. Their commitment to preserving their common is clear. Yet, they pursue simultaneously 
other activities that are deeply enmeshed with capitalism. Much of the present literature puts 
forward the common as a tool to coaelesce widespread opposition to capitalism and state control. 
Empirical research shows us that actors involved in constructing and maintaining commons rather 
seek a compromise and interactions with the state and with capitalism. For example, most 
Palestinian villages that maintain commons to manage their springs, their agricultural wells and their 
irrigation systems also resort to reticulation systems supplied by Mekorot, the Israeli water 
company, or by the Palestinian Water Authority for drinking water. In Al Jalame, farmers resort to 
“illegally” drilled boreholes because their four licensed wells have been dry since 2006. The overall 
volume of water they extract through their “illegal” boreholes amounts to 25% of the total of the 
yearly quotas attributed to the four “legal” wells. They would much prefer pumping their full quotas 
from the “legal” wells but they are forbidden from refurbishing them. Their strategy of drilling 
small boreholes they keep hidden is not a strategy aimed at fighting capitalism or the state. It is only 
aimed at survival in the face of adversity. They are keen to maintain their common. But they would 
prefer to keep doing it via the licensed wells, which would be far more secure. At the moment, 
unexpected visits from Israeli authorities result in the destruction of their unlicensed boreholes, a 
costly loss for the farmers who pay the full cost of drilling them. 
Much of the political ecology studies concerned with water have followed a theoretical framework 
deeply influenced by David Harvey. He saw neoliberalism forever enlarging the realm of what could 
be appropriated by Capital. He saw a progressive aspect in this dispossession as he deemed it 
hastened the advent of Socialism. (Harvey 2010) As a result, political ecology studies inspired by 
David Harvey often focus on the privatisation of urban water management while dismissing the 
commons so prevalent in rural water management as a doomed, archaic form. In Harvey’s logic, 
these commons are unavoidably dispossessed in the march of history. As a result, the political 
ecology literature has neglected the importance of the commons in water management. 
We propose to recognise the centrality of the commons in water management in Palestinian 
territories. This result emerges from empirical research based on fieldwork. We define a “water 
common” as a socially constructed set of co-obligations concerning human use of water that is 
produced endogenously to manage aspects of water that can never be appropriated. Palestinian 
water commons manage flows far more than they manage stocks. We propose to integrate the 
construction of techno-science when examining the water commons. The construction of techno-
science is as political as that of the commons. Yet, most actors involved in both constructions are 
 
rarely aware of the political aspects of the activity. We propose to examine simultaneously the 
interactions that right holders within water commons maintain with other commons, and with other 
actors such as the Palestinian Authority and Israel. This can be achieved through a study of the 
paracommons of Palestinian water. 
 
IV. The paracommons of Palestinian water  
The term paracommons was coined to designate the Commons made up by the material gains 
resulting from potential efficiency improvements. (Lankford 2013) Such gains are dynamic because 
the efficiency gain in one system often entails a loss in a neighbouring system or in a distant, yet 
interlinked, system. These material gains thus constitute a new commons, the appropriation of 
which needs to be governed. Various users, various systems and various sectors may compete for 
the material gains resulting from these efficiency gains. Generating a greater efficiency within an 
irrigation system is usually portrayed as freeing up water resources for the environment or for 
another sector such as drinking water. Yet, most often, this does not happen. The “additional” 
water that is produced thanks to this efficiency gain is most often appropriated by the owner of the 
water right. 
An efficiency gain in one system means deviating the trajectory of water along its previous path to 
another path. Whoever might have been using water along the previous path, is dispossessed. This 
user may be nature, the neighbour’s field or the neighbouring village’s well. The paracommons 
designate the sum total of the water savings that could be generated by a variety of projects aiming 
at improving the efficiency of a number of systems. The prefix para is used because these gains do 
not exist yet. They are only possible if technological improvements are carried out. They are commons 
because a gain that appears in one system is necessarily linked to a reduction elsewhere. As a result, 
“improving” the efficiency of a system is not something that is carried out in isolation from the 
other systems. These gains necessarily form a Common, for which collective decisions need to be 
made. Yet, a project purporting to improve efficiency of water use systematically receives the 
support of a donor without any deliberation with the various actors presently relying on the current 
trajectory of water created thanks to the “inefficiency” of the system that will be improved. Our 
scientific discourse convinces us that improving the efficiency of water use is always good. So, those 
actors who succeed in capturing the donors’ attention in Palestinian territories also succeed in 
deviating water flows from other users to themselves. 
The great number of options that conversions and losses can decompose to when an irrigation 
system is made “more efficient” and interconnections among various springs, wells, villages, 
irrigation systems through the flow of water need to be explored. The term “paragains” designates 
potential resources that are “created” by changes to the efficiency and net demand of resource use. 
(Lankford 2013)(p.32) Such paragains can be generated in either of three ways: 
- by reducing the present demand and lowering the future demand for water, 
- by recovering and using the water that was previously a “waste” in the process, i.e. a loss 
that could have been recovered but wasn’t, 
 
- by transforming “wastages”, i.e. non-recoverable losses into “wastes”, i.e. recoverable losses 
with a view to recover them. 
 
Irrigation engineers typically distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic withdrawals. Intrinsic 
withdrawals designate the water that is beneficially used, i.e. the water that is evapotranspired 
through the leaves of plants that are cultivated (not weeds). Extrinsic withdrawals designate the 
water that is not beneficially used. For example, the water that evaporates through the leaves of a 
tree that grows next to an irrigation canal constitutes an extrinsic withdrawal according to an 
irrigation engineer. Yet, the shade that tree provides to the field laborers eating their lunch may be 
very beneficial to them. Intrinsic and extrinsic withdrawals are not objectively defined. They are co-
constructed through a process whereby scientific claims interact with political claims of ownership, 
excess or waste of the resource. Science and technology studies have demonstrated the manner we 
understand nature cannot be dissociated from the manner we want to control it. (Jasanoff 2004) As 
our scientific understanding of nature changes, i.e. as the “natural order” as we understand it 
changes, our “social order” is unavoidably affected. The reverse is also true. Any quantification of 
the efficiency gains and their trajectories thus necessarily needs to be carried out simultaneously 
with a consideration of how and why we are defining this as an efficiency gain and how and why the 
trajectories of these gains were socially, economically and politically constructed. 
Since 1994, donors have been funding water related projects extensively in Palestinian territories (Le 
More 2008). They have funded waste water treatment plants, water reticulation networks, deep 
wells, pumping stations, the cementing of irrigation channels, the transformation of open air 
irrigation channels into pressurised pipe systems... Every time, the project documents argued this 
would lead to an improvement in the efficiency of water use. The project documents always 
assumed that the Palestinian water law would apply. Yet, a situation of legal pluralism prevails. 
(Trottier 2007) This is often the case in states that emerged from decolonisation. (Meinzen-Dick 
and Pradhan 2001) While the official law in Ramallah specifies that water is public property, the 
rules deployed to manage most of the water that is used and consumed by Palestinians are spelt out 
by a great number of commons each constructed over the use of a spring or a well. The context in 
which the paracommons of water are presently appropriated is one where commons are prevalent 
even though proto-state institutions, such as those of the Palestinian Authority and state 
institutions, such as those of Israel, are playing a significant role. We propose to recognise water as 
a flow and to recognise the present role of the great variety of commons in managing Palestinian 
water to tackle the tricky question of the governance of the paracommons.  
So far, the water development projects funded by the donors have rarely considered the manner 
they were interrelated from the point of view of water flow. Yet, as each of them deviates a water 
flow from an initial trajectory into a new one, they systematically affect those who were previously 
engaging with the initial trajectory of water. Donors have systematically engaged with the 
Palestinian Water Authority to develop a government of water.  They have failed to engage with the 
multiplicity of institutions, including the many commons, that presently carry out water governance in 
the Palestinian territories. Exploring the governance of the paracommons provides us with an 
opportunity to understand how a variety of actors exert power to determine the decisions made 
regarding water management. 
 
 
V. Why harnessing the commons can be useful  
The commons property movement demonstrated the economic efficiency of managing water 
through commons. That literature focused on a very small scalar level such as, for example, the area 
cultivated using water from a given spring. It largely treated the commons it studied as if they were 
small systems functioning in autarchy. Recent scholarship has been arguing that the common, as a 
principle of political organisation, could coalesce anticapitalist movements globally. That literature is 
extremely rich theoretically, but its authors do not tend to carry out fieldwork. Fieldwork spent 
studying the interactions that commons have with each other, with the state and with other actors 
allows us to face the messiness of the world. Such research shows us that the same actors who are 
keen to defend their common to manage their spring or their well also engage simultaneously with 
the state and with capitalism. They never exist in autarchy, neither isolated from capitalism nor 
from the state. 
The commons that are presently managing most of Palestinian used water offer extremely useful 
externalities. Their members are used to deliberate and compromise on the basis of commonly 
agreed principles. This allows the rules to be accepted and implemented. This contrasts with the 
manner the very same people may not abide by the rules parachuted upon them by the Palestinian 
Authority. We rarely observe water thefts in farmer managed commons of water. Yet, a village that 
manages its spring very carefully via a common, often simultaneously demonstrates a great 
tolerance for illegal connections on the municipal reticulation network that brings drinking water to 
the houses. The inhabitants respect the rules that were produced endogenously but they often 
disregard those that were parachuted upon them by an authority they do not respect very much.  
A common can only be produced endogenously. The group of right holders defines both their co-
obligations and the boundary between those who are excluded from any right to the resource and 
those who have some rights. Within a common, a great variety of rights and right holders may exist. 
This is probably the most problematic aspect when tackling the issue of harnessing the commons 
within a wider institutional framework such as a state. For example, the manner water has been 
included within human rights only recognizes rights to individuals - the same right to every 
individual. Promoting the inclusion of commons in managing any resource means accepting that 
categories of right holders may be defined by nonstate actors and that all individuals will not have 
the same rights. Commons grant rights to collectives on the basis of criteria that often appear to 
contradict modern state law. They are often dismissed for this reason. Yet, our examination of the 
paracommons shows us that development projects do not hesitate to deviate water flows away from 
groups of users that were previously benefiting from them. This is done unwittingly because 
efficiency improvements are conceived in a piecemeal approach, without factoring in the 
interconnections between the various systems the efficiency of which is supposed to be improved. 
In this case, the categorization of users who benefit and others who lose is carried out by the 
scientific definition of the efficiency that is considered and by the criteria used by the donor to 
select its beneficiaries. Clearly, all individuals don’t have the same rights in this context either.  
 
Palestinian farmers manage wells and springs that are, aquifer wise, upstream from Israel. Their 
commons are the most appropriate institutions to regulate non point source pollution linked to 
agricultural inputs. Harnessing them into a wider institutional structure that manages water will thus 
benefit both the Palestinian Authority and its neighbor, Israel. Moreover, commons are used to 
manage water as a flow. Springs are divided according to water turns during which the full flow or 
half the flow is directed to the right holder during the length of time of his water turn. This could 
be ten minutes, a few hours, or more. Wells deliver hours of water, even when the farmers’ 
greenhouses have meters. Such a system distributes abundance, when the spring flow is high or 
when the pump is well maintained, and scarcity, when the spring flow decreases in summer or when 
the well needs to be refurbished, in an unequal yet socially accepted manner. 
If we choose to consider water as a flow instead of as a stock, the present squabbles over quantities 
that presently stall any progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over water, simply disappear. This 
means removing flags from water drops, recognizing that every user is handling a water drop that 
has already been used several times and will be used again many times before it leaves the system. 
As water flows, it cannot be appropriated. Instead, it can be managed successfully if all of the 
institutions interacting with that flow, whether commons or state institutions, are gathered into an 
institutional structure on the basis of commonly agreed principles. No one in either Israel or the 
Palestinian Territories will disagree with the idea that water needs to be managed in an economically 
viable and environmentally sustainable fashion, that drinking water must be given priority, and that 
any agreement needs to be implementable. No one will disagree with the principle of subsidiarity 
either, according to which a problem should always be solved at the most appropriate scalar level, 
usually the smallest scalar level. An adequate institutional structure would recognise the existence of 
the commons presently managing Palestinian water through a local water management board. It 
would include a mediation board where any institution, whether a small common or a state ministry 
could lodge a complaint. Wadi Fukin could complain there about the surrounding urbanisation that 
destroys the flow of its springs. The Israeli ministry of health could complain about chemicals used 
in agriculture and polluting the aquifer. 
Although such a structure deserves a far more detailed description than is possible here, it is not far 
fetched. Ibn Khaldun argued as far back as the 14th century that a powerful state could only exist if 
it harnessed the assabiyah (the social capital) of the different communal forms of social organisations 
that composed it. Western states arose as the dominant form of social organisation because 
communal forms of social organisation progressively disappeared from the 15th century onward. 
This did not happen elsewhere. Legal pluralism thrives wherever the sate has not achieved the 
predominance it did in Europe. Instead of ignoring the commons that presently play such a crucial 
role in water governance in Palestinian territories, we can choose to harness them into an 
institutional structure over a wide scalar level. 
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